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DICKINSON LAW REVIEWO
THE APPEARANCE DE BENE ESSE: IS IT AN ANTIQUE UNDER
THE PRESENT RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
IN PENNSYLVANIA?
Before posing an answer to the title query, it is important to examine the
background and the nature of the appearance de bene esse in Pennsylvania practice
prior to the promulgation of the 1947 Rules Of Civil Procedure.
The first question which must be considered is the nature or character of an
appearance de bene esse. The Latin term freely interpreted means "conditionally"
or "provisionally", and thus the meaning is conveyed that such an appearance is
one which is conditional in its nature. "In Pennsylvania at an early day judgment
for want of an appearance in proceedings at law was authorized by statute, and
a practice arose, unknown elsewhere, of entering an appearance de bene esse, under
which the defendant was permitted to question the form and service of the writ
without being liable for default . 1. "' The practice of entering such an appearance
would seem to antedate the Revolutionary War in Pennsylvania. In support of this
contention that the practice dated from the early days of the colony, it was noted
in an 1824 decision that "The appearance de bene esse is peculiar to the courts
of this state and has invariably prevailed. . .I have known the practice for more
than forty years and have seen entries long before that time." 2
The scope of such an appearance in Pennsylvania is discussed in Jeanette
Borough v. Roehme,8 where it is stated as follows:
"The defendant may, indeed, appear for the purpose of questioning
the right of the court to proceed in the cause, as by denying its jurisdic
tion, or that he has been brought within its jurisdiction by due service
of process. This is usually done by an appearance de bene esse. Such an
appearance, raising no question as to the merits of the case, is not an ap-
pearance to the action and is attended by none of its consequences. But
to have this effect such appearance must be confined strictly to its legiti-
mate purpose-the deniaf that the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction
of th'e court. When more than this is done under such an appearance, it
will be treated as general, and the defendant will be bound by the judg-
ment of the court.'
The narrow scope of the appearance is thus clearly defined by the court. By
appearing specially the defendant places himself in the position of admitting the
court's authority to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction while at the same
instance contesting that jurisdicton. On occasion, this admission of the court's au-
thority by the defendant may inadvertently open the door to a complete surrender
to the jurisdiction of the court by evolving into a general appearance. In this respect,
it is of significance to examine the degree of participation which will amount to
a surrender to the jurisdiction of the court, that is, converting a special appearance
into a general appearance.
1 Taylor v. McCafferty, 27 Pa. Super. 122 (1905).
2 Blair v. Weaver, 11 S. & R. 84 (1824).
3 197 Pa. 230, 47 At. 283 (1900).
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There is no statutory declaration as to what degree of participation will have
the effect of converting a special appearance into a general appearance. Hence,
to determine the bounds which a litigant may not safely exceed, it is necessary
to thoroughly examine the cases which have discussed the matter. The court,
speaking generally in Farmer's Trust Co. v. Alexander,4 said:
"The vital test in determining whether an appearance is general
or special is found in what is doneby way of participation in the action
. . . if his acts reveal a consistant determination not to submit to the
court's jurisdiction, then he is not such an actor in the cause as to be held
to have waived any jurisdictional defects. . . . The function of an ap-
pearance de bene esse is to show that the person so appearing refuses to
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court unless it is finally
determined by the court that he has forever waived his right to ques-
tion the court's jurisdiction over his person."
More specific illustrations of what degree of participation will convert
an appearance de bene esse into a general appearance are exemplified by the
following cases:
(1) Appearance de bene esse entered after the return day of the
writ and when the sheriff's return was on the record is the equivalent of
a full general appearance. 5
(2) A qualified appearance is of avail only when the writ or service
is defective and in the absence of such defect such appearance becomes
general in its effect.6
(3) An agreement of counsel, extending the time limit for the
filing of an affidavit of defense, has the effect of creating a general ap-
pearance and is sufficient to waive any defect in the service or return of
summons so that any subsequent filing of an appearance de bene esse
could not alter the situation.
7
(4) If in addition to his plea to the jurisdiction a defendant sets
up a defense to the merits of the controversy, he thereby submits him-
self to the jurisdiction of the court and must thereafter abide by its judg-
ment on both issues. 8
(5) The giving of bail to the action has always been regarded as
a general appearance.9
(6) The filing of a defense to the merits or the agreeing to an
amicable action are general appearances and they cure any defect or
irregularity in the service of the writ.10
(7) The Rules of Court of Schuylkill County, as noted in Leonard
v. Atlas Nitrate Co.,1 state that an appearance de bene esse will become
a general appearance in ten days unless exceptions are filed.
4 334 Pa. 434, 6 A.2d 262 (1939). This decision shows that the de bene esse appearance of
Pennsylvania is the equivalent of the special appearance of the common law.
5 Daley v. Iselin, 212 Pa. 279, 61 AtI. 919 (1905).
G Bolard and Snyder v. Mason, 66 Pa. 138 (1870).
7 Riker v. Kilinski, 309 Pa. 188, 163 AtI. 526 (1932).
8 Byers v. Byers, 208 Pa. 23, 57 Atl. 62 (1904).
0 James I. Wright v. Millikin, 152 Pa. 507, 25 Atd. 756 (1893).
10 McCullough v. Railway Mail Association, 225 Pa. 118, 73 At. 1007 (1909).
11 31 York Leg. Rec. 124 (1917).
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These citations, of necessity, do not completely cover the sphere of actions
which are sufficient to convert a special appearance into a general appearance, but
they are indeed sufficient to illustrate the narrow scope of the appearance de bene
esse, the necessity for timeliness in the use of such an appearance, and the disaster
of superfluity.
Another factor which will aid in the determination of the answer to the title
query is that the appearance de bene esse has always existed by reason of custom
and local rule of court and was never cemented by legislation, although it was
granted recognition by statute.' 2 The orphan's court, in Wormley's Estate,'2
stated in effect that an appearance de bene esse was not recognized by the orphan's
court since it was not provided for by legislation or by rules prescribed for that
court. Also, in Taylor v. McCafferty,14 the court sitting as an equity court said
in essence that an appearance de bene esse such as was customary in the courts of
this state could not be treated as a conditional appearance in equity. "Here the
words de bene esse in a praecipe have no meaning in equity practice and rejecting
them as surplusage leaves the appearance general."' 15 The court, by dicta, points
out in Sporkin v. MacBride,'6 that in Philadelphia County the appearance de bene
esse was merely a rule of court which is no longer permitted in the courts of that
county. The foregoing, however, should not be interpreted as an indication that
objections to the jurisdiction of the court would not have been permitted prior
to the promulgation of the 1947 Pennsylvania Rules Of Civil Procedure. In this
connection, it has been held:
"In jurisdictions where appearances de bene esse are abolished by
rule of court, the defendant cannot, without a general appearance, be
heard to object to the cause of action stated, which is the appropriate sub-
ject of demurrer; but may appear specially to challenge a jurisdictional
fact, by deposition or proof dehors the record".17
Having thus analyzed the nature and the character of the appearance de bene
esse, one is led to a determination of its status under the 1947 Pennsylvania Rules
Of Civil Procedure:
"Rule 1017. Pleadings Allowed
(a) The pleadings in an action arfe limited to a complaint, an answer
thereto, a reply if the answer contains new matter or a counterclaim, a
counter-reply if the reply to a counterclaim contains new matter, a pre-
liminary objection, and answer thereto, and a motion for judgment on
the pleadings.
(b) Preliminary objections are available to any party and are limited to
(1 a petition raising a question of jurisdiction;
(2) a motion to strike of f a pleading because of lack of conformity
to law or rule of court or because of scandalous or impertinent matter;
12 Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23, 12 P.S. § 673.
18 359 Pa. 295, 59 A.2d 98 (1948).
14 27 Pa. Super 122 (1905).
15 Taylor v. McCafferty, 27 Pa. Super. 122 (1905).
16 95 Pa. Super. 71 (1928).
17 Clement & Co. v. Didier-March Co., 13 Northampton Co. Rep. 293 (1912).
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(3) a motion for a more specific pleading;
(4) a demurrer; and
(5) a petition raising the defense of lack of capacity to sue, pend-
ency of a prior action, non-joinder of a necessary party or misjoinder of
a cause of action.
(c) No formal joinder of issue is required. Adopted June 25, 1946.
Effective Jan. 1, 1947."
Under the operation of Section (b) (1) of this rule, the question of juris-
diction must b'e raised by a preliminary objection. This provision expressly re-
places the former practice under the Act of 1925,18 which authorized the raising
of jurisdictional questions by a preliminary petition and rule to show cause. Such
procedure under the Act of 1925 was deemed de bene esse only and did not operate
as a general appearance.' 9 Thus, it is seen that even under the Act of 1925, the
appearance de bene esse was regularly recognized in this state as a means of ap-
pearing to contest the jurisdiction of the court over the parties in an action. The
only provisions of the Act of 1925 not suspended by the promulgation of the
1947 Rules in regard to the means of raising the question of jurisdiction are the
sections relating to the right of an appeal from a decision on a jurisdictional ques-
tion. These provisions relating to appeal have been effectively retained in the
1947 Rules.20 Whether or not the Act of 1925, was intended by the legislature to
negate the necessity of filing an appearance de bene esse where the procedure as
established under the act was followed, or whether such an appearance was re-
quired even under the act became a moot question upon the promulgation of the
1947 Rules Of Civil Procedure. In either event, after the rep'eal of the Act of 1925,
what occurred was a return to the common law as concerned the filing of an ap-
pearance de bene esse: (1) if the effect of the Act of 1925 was to require the filing
of an appearance de bene esse in addition to the filing of a preliminary petition
and rule to show cause, this has been expressly repealed as already noted above;
and (2) if the effect of the Act of 1925 was to render an appearance de bene esse
superfluous where the procedure as established in the act was followed, this in-
18 Act of March 25, 1925, P. L. 23, 12 P.S. § 672 et seq.
19 Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23, 12 P.S. § 672, which states "Wherever at any proceeding at
law or in equity the question of jurisdiction over the defendant or of the cause of action for which
suit is brought is raised in the court of the first instance, it shall be preliminarily determined by
the court upon the pleadings or with depositions, as the case may require; and the decision may
be appealed to the Supreme Court, as in cases of final judgments." 673. Petition; rule to show
cause. "All such preliminary questions shall be raised by petition setting forth the facts relied upon,
whereupon a rule to show cause shall be granted, and such preliminary question disposed of by
the court. Such procedure shall be deemed de bene esse only and shall not operate as a general
appearance." Note that both of the above sections have been expressly repealed, except in so far as
regards the provisions relating to appeals, by Rule 1451 (b) (7) of the 1947 Rules Of Civil Pro-
cedure.
20 Rule 1451 (b) (7): Rule 1451. In General: "The following Acts of Assembly are suspended
in so far as they apply to the practice and procedure in actions governed by Rules of Civi Pro-
cedure, to the extent hereinafter set forth, in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of the
Act approved June 21, 1937, P.L. 1982, No. 392. (b) Acts Relating to Pleadings. (7) Sections 1
and 2 of the Act approved March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, No. 15, 12 P.S. secs. 672,673, except in so far
as they relate to appeals."
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terpretation too has been expressly repealed by Rule 1451 (b) (7). Thus, we
must now consider the appearance de bene esse as the concept was developed in
the common law and its present applicability under the 1947 Rules.
At this point, it might be well to consider several recent Pennsylvania cases
which concern the nature of an app~arance de bene esse and its application and
use since the promulgation of the 1947 Rules Of Civil Procedure. In Jamison v.
United Cigar Whelan Stores et al.,21 the Philadelphia County Court stated:
"The Act of 1925, P.L. 23, s'ec. 2, 12 P.S. sec. 673, allowed the
raising of jurisdictional questions preliminarily by a de bene esse appear-
ance with the right of immediate appeal. Under the new Rules of Civil
Procedure, a preliminary objection is proper, for Rule 1017 (b) (1)
replaces the practice of raising the jurisdictional question by means of the
procedure in accordance with the Act of March 5, 1925.... .
In this case, the facts were that the defendant entered an appearance de bene
esse (this after the 1947 Rules had been in effect for two years) and also at the
same time filed a motion to strike off the service of the writ of summons on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendant. The court further
stated, "We cannot pass over the failure of the parties to comply with the pro-
visions of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure .. " This language used by
the court in this decision seems to indicate that the court under the 1947 Rules no
longer requires the filing of an appearance de bene esse, in order that the de-
fendant be able to safely question the jurisdiction of the court by means of a pre-
liminary objection in the nature of a petition raising the question of jurisdiction.
The court thus applies strictly the language of the Rules and regards the appear-
ance de bene esse as superfluous.
This 1949 decision, however, should be compared with a more recent de-
cision on the matter also rendered by the Philadelphia County Court, wherein the
court, commenting upon the record brought up from the lower court, said:
"The court below intimated but did not decide that the effect of
the suspension of the Act of 1925 was to abolish appearances de bene
esse, and that defendant's limited appearance might constitute a general
appearance. This case does not require appellate pronouncement. The
court below and this Court permitted appellant to press his preliminary
objection under his appearance de bene esse, and the court below will
not construe that special appearance as a general appearance or convert it
into a general appearance against his will." 22
From the language used by the court in rendering this opinion it would seem
that the appearance de bene esse may still be used in objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court. Indeed, it seems that such an appearance is considered as properly
contemporaneous with a preliminary objection. It is from a consideration of these
two cases that we now turn our attention to the problem of interpretation created
by the promulgation of Rule 1017, more particularly Section (b) (1).
21 68 D. & C. 121 (1949).
22 Barradough v. Barraclough, 167 Pa. Super. 608, 76 A.2d 504 (1950).
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To hold that Rule 1017 does otherwise than abolish the former methods for
raising jurisdictional questions in Pennsylvania civil practice would be to do
an injustice to the language used in that rule and in Rule 1451 which abolishes the
provisions of the Act of 1925.23 It is clear that there is no mention made of the ap-
pearance de bene esse and the rule itself sets out an entirely new method of ac-
complishing an objection to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, from the language
of the rule, it would seem logical that the former practice was impliedly dissolved.
It is clearly obvious, however, from the decision in the Barraclough case 24 that
such will not be the interpretation uniformly placed upon that rule by the courts.
This consequence might be explained away upon the grounds of the ever present
conservatism which is found to prevail in courts of law. On the other hand, the
refusal of some courts to do away with appearances de bene esse may be justified
by their interpretation of Rule 1017 (b) (1) and its effect upon present Penn-
sylvania practice. This being the situation, it becomes necessary to examine the
various alternatives which present themselves.
What would be the result in Pennsylvania today should the defendant file a
preliminary objection in the nature of a petition raising the question of jurisdic-
tion along with a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer without first
entering an appearance de bene esse in the appearance docket? Could the plaintiff
regard this as a general appearance?
First, the courts could recognize that an appearance de bene esse has been
completely abolished, thus regarding the entry of such an appearance by the de-
fendant as if nothing had been done in the matter. The difficulty apparent in this
interpretation is that the courts would be quick to realize the number of default
judgments which would result (in the abs-ence of any other action by the de-
fendant), at least until de bene esse became generally recognized as anachronistic,
and the increasing number of default judgments was the precise reason for the
appearance de bene esse; that it could be used to object to irregular service of
process which at the common law was resulting in a great number of default
judgments. Thus, it appears that this first interpretation would not find a wide
acceptance in the courts of Pennsylvania as a matter of logic. Under this alterna-
tive, the suggested answer to the question posed above, concerning the result in
the proceedings between our theoretical litigants, would be that an appearance de
bene esse constitutes a requisite to preserving the special nature of the appearance.
Secondly, the courts could regard the appearance de bene esse as general in
its effect. As noted in previous cases,2 5 %such a result would conform the prac-
tice adopted in the orphan's courts and the equity courts of Pennsylvania. The
basic objection to this interpretation is that by the immediate conversion to a
general appearance the defendant is at once precluded from contesting the juris-
23 Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23, 12 P.S. § 672 et seq.
24 See n. 22, supra.
25 Wormley's Estate, 359 Pa. 295, 59 A.2d 98 (1948) ; Taylor v. McCafferty, 27 Pa. Super. 122
(1905).
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diction of the court, at least by means of a separate dilatory proceeding. This ob-
jection, however, could conceivably be met with an argument that since the main
purpose of the 1947 Rules Of Civil Procedure is to expedite the proceedings and
bring the case to a final consideration upon the merits presented, that any formal
appearance not mentioned in the Rules should be deemed general in nature. Thus,
under this second alternative, the purposes for which the new Rules were intended
would be best served. In effect, by regarding the appearance de bene esse as gen-
eral in nature, the court is able to proceed with a determination of the controversy
upon the merits presented.
Thirdly, the special appearance could be regarded under the 1947 Rules
Of Civil Procedure as being properly contemporaneous with the vehicle of ob-
jection to the jurisdiction of the court, the preliminary objection raising the ques-
tion of jurisdiction. Under this interpretation, our hypothetical defendant would
first have to enter a special appearance before raising his objction to the juris-
diction of the court. Considering the purpose of the Rules, this interpretation
would not in any sense contravene the objectives stated above. By operation of
Rule 1017 (b) (1) only a single-step dilatory proceeding is permitted the de-
fendant. Hence, where an objection to the jurisdiction of thL court is filed along
with other dilatory objections under a preliminary objection, the question arises
if such action will not be considered as a general appearance, the defendant having
prejudiced his right to raise the jurisdictional question by pleading matters other
than to the jurisdiction. Here, expert opinion 26 on this question seems to regard
the filing of such additional objections as not sufficient to convert the appearance
into a general appearance. This is ncessary in order to give effect to Rule 1017
(b) (1) which expressly allows the raising of the question of jurisdiction. In this
respect, it would seem that the filing of an appearance de bene esse where such a
problem of interpretation has arisen could only serve to resolve the conflict in
favor of the view that such joinder as contemplated in Rule 1017 would not con-
stitute a general appearance, should the court determine it had jurisdiction, merely
because of the joinder.
Thus, in conclusion, it appears that an appearance de bene esse does not seem
anachronistic under the operation of Rule 1017 (b) (1). The correct interpre-
tation of the procedure under Rule 1017 (b) (1) seems to be that the appearance
de bene esse has resumed its common law status in Pennsylvania and that such
an appearance should be filed where a defendant would successfully attempt to
contest the jurisdiction of the court by the preliminary objection of the Rules. As
noted, the use of the appearance would also serve to strengthen the view, noted
above, that the filing of a preliminary objection contesting the jurisdiction of the
court along with other objections in the preliminary pleading would not create a
general appearance solely by such procedure.
Theodore L. Krohn
Mtmber of the Middler Class
26 Goodrich-Amram, § 1017 (b) (7), p. 66 (1933).
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